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Reading Between the Lines:                        
Medicaid, Early Periodic Screening              
Diagnosis and Treatment, and Section 1983 
Rachel Min Luke1 
 
I am concerned about services.  I don’t want to lose my son. I want 
to get my son help now before he goes and robs a store or 
something and then he gets taken away. (New York)2 
 
My son didn’t really get any help until I had him arrested. . . . I had 
to call the police on him and say he hit me, which he did. But I 
kind of thought to myself when I woke up that day, “Okay. Today 
I’m going to let him hit me. We’re going to play a game.” 
(Oregon)3 
INTRODUCTION 
The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) 
provision of the Medicaid Act provides that Medicaid-eligible children 
under the age of twenty-one should receive any medically necessary 
physical or mental health services.4 However, many Medicaid-eligible 
children are left without mental health care treatment, often because they 
are unable to access the services to which they are legally entitled under the 
EPSDT provision.5 Thus, the issue presented is twofold. First, because 
children’s behavioral and cognitive mental health issues are not being 
addressed through intervention and preventative care, youth often develop 
behavioral problems and sometimes end up in juvenile detention centers.6 
Second, when individuals seek recourse for a state’s failure to provide 
legally entitled mental health services, they face a difficult judicial road 
because the circuit courts are split as to whether individuals have a private 
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right of action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against states that fail to provide 
EPSDT services.7 
Addressing the second of these issues, I argue that the statutory language 
of the EPSDT provision of the Medicaid Act and underlying policies 
indicate that suits under § 1983 of the Medicaid Act, especially suits to 
enforce medically necessary mental health care for children, are appropriate 
private actions to bring to the federal courts. Additionally, I argue that a 
pragmatic textualism approach to analyzing the EPSDT provisions of the 
Medicaid Act is more accurate than utilizing a strict textualism approach. 
In Part I, I provide a brief overview of the history of Medicaid and its 
role in providing mental health care services to children. In Part II, after a 
brief history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, I consider the legal landscape 
for plaintiffs seeking to bring actions under § 1983 through the lens of 
existing cases. Part III discusses two approaches to the textualism analysis 
that the Supreme Court requires under Gonzaga University v. Doe8 and 
Blessing v. Freestone9 for potential § 1983 suits. There I argue that future 
courts should follow the pragmatic textualism approach for a more accurate 
reading of the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act. Finally, Part IV 
concludes with a discussion of what actions the Supreme Court and 
Congress could take to help remedy the situation. 
I. MEDICAID HISTORY 
On July 30, 1965, the Medicaid Act was enacted as Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act.10 The Medicaid Act committed the citizens of the 
United States to provide basic medical services to millions of low-income 
Americans.11 Today, Medicaid covers almost sixty-one million people and 
is the nation’s largest program financing health and mental health care.12 In 
2007, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services reported that 29.2 
million children were enrolled Medicaid beneficiaries.13  
Medicaid acts as a federal-state partnership in which states can choose to 
opt into the program that is administered by the states.14 All fifty states, the 
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District of Columbia, and many U.S. territories choose to opt into the 
Medicaid program.15 States must cover all medically necessary services for 
children, though they have considerable flexibility over eligibility and 
covered services for adults.16 Eligibility is based on an individual’s income 
and resources, but the states have discretion to establish varied eligible 
beneficiary groups.17 Even so, individuals must have a low to moderate 
income to qualify themselves and their dependents for Medicaid.18 If a state 
elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it must comply with all 
provisions of the federal Medicaid statute19 and its implementing 
regulations, except for those individual requirements that may be waived by 
the federal government.20  
A. Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment 
In 1967, Congress added the EPSDT program to the Medicaid Act.21 The 
EPSDT program was designed to correct or ameliorate chronic conditions.22 
The initial program was optional; however, by 1989, Congress had begun to 
voice concerns that given the optional nature of the EPSDT provision and 
the absence of a detailed statutory description of its requirements, many 
states chose not to provide EPSDT services and care to Medicaid-eligible 
children.23 
On December 19, 1989, Congress amended the Medicaid statute’s 
EPSDT provisions to guarantee that persons under twenty-one years of age, 
regardless of their ability to pay, would receive all medical care deemed 
reasonably necessary.24 This provision is substantially different from 
Medicaid’s coverage for adults because the EPSDT provisions are more 
expansive in the number and types of services available.25 The amendment 
mandated that participating state agencies provide EPSDT-eligible children 
“[s]uch other necessary health care . . . described in [the Act’s § 1396d(a) 
definition of ‘medical assistance’] to correct or ameliorate defects and . . . 
illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or 
not such services are covered under the State plan.”26 In addition, the 1989 
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amendments to the EPSDT program required that the service and care 
provided by states include all twenty-eight of the types of care and services 
included as part of the definition of medical assistance in the revised Act.27 
These services include inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital 
services, laboratory and x-ray services, any type of remedial care, home 
health services, preventative services, case-management services, and any 
other medical care.28  
The primary purpose of EPSDT is prevention: it aims to “ensure that 
poor children receive comprehensive health care at an early age, so that they 
will develop fewer health problems as they get older.”29 The standard of 
coverage is necessarily broad; it provides that the standard level of medical 
necessity used by a state must sufficiently cover, and not merely treat, an 
already existing illness or injury, and it must also prevent the potential 
development or worsening of conditions, illnesses, and disabilities.30 Thus, 
the EPSDT provisions are located in several parts of the Medicaid Act.31 
The services participating states are required to provide are found in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396d(r).32 Specifically, state Medicaid plans must provide for 
arranging (directly or through referral to appropriate agencies, 
organizations, or individuals) any necessary corrective treatment identified 
by health screening services.33 
While the EPSDT provisions are meant to be preventative and expansive, 
children often do not receive the mental health screening or treatment to 
which they are entitled because services often are not available in all 
communities, and too few providers are available to meet the needs of those 
covered by Medicaid.34 There are several reasons for this disparity in 
services, but two issues stand out. 
First, the mental health services and screenings required under EPSDT 
are unavailable in many communities because some agencies have elected 
not to offer the required substantive services. In fact, services are 
unavailable in so many communities that, most of the time, Medicaid-
eligible children do not receive either the mental health screens or treatment 
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to which they are entitled.35 This is inconsistent with federal law because 
under the Medicaid Act, each participating state must establish 
administrative mechanisms to “identify available screening and diagnostic 
facilities, to assure that individuals under twenty-one years of age who     
are eligible for medical assistance may receive the services of such              
facilities . . . .”36  
Second, low fees associated with participation in Medicaid have 
dissuaded some practitioners from providing Medicaid services, and as a 
result, only a limited number of practitioners are available to EPSDT 
beneficiaries.37 This has forced some practitioners to limit or deny services 
altogether to children enrolled in Medicaid programs.38 As a result, children 
are placed on long waitlists to obtain needed treatment.39 An Oregon 
woman commented: “Getting in to see a psychiatrist is impossible. You get 
in and there’s a three-month wait for an appointment. To get her meds 
reevaluated another three months, and then in the meantime, she was off the 
deep end and out of her mind.”40  
Because mental health care services are unavailable in some communities 
and some practitioners have chosen not to offer these services, often, by the 
time a child receives treatment, he or she has already exhibited behavioral 
problems.41 Many times, these children end up in the juvenile justice 
system.42 This can be due to a number of complex factors, including the 
reality that untreated mental conditions or illness can sometimes lead to 
substance abuse, outbursts of anger, defiance of authority, truancy, theft, 
and vandalism.43 Therefore, the consensus among mental health experts, 
correctional officers, and parents is that children are more effectively served 
in communities that are able to address mental health issues.44 Studies 
suggest that more than 70 percent of children in the juvenile justice system 
have a mental health disorder, and approximately 20 percent have a serious 
mental illness.45 Thus, the overlap between the juvenile justice and mental 
health populations is unavoidable when discussing issues arising from either 
topic. Many of the behavioral issues associated with mental illness may 
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have been intercepted if the children had access to the mental health 
services mandated by federal law.  
The conclusion of Seattle-based researchers in one study is astounding. 
Children eligible for public mental health services were three times more 
likely to have contact with the juvenile justice system than a comparable 
sample of the general population.46 This problem is highlighted by reports 
from around the country suggesting that families are encountering 
excessively long waitlists when seeking community-based mental health 
services for their children, and thus, are not receiving medically necessary 
mental health treatment.47 Therefore, because of defects in state 
implementation of Medicaid, youth across the country are left with 
untreated mental health issues, and many of these youth are ultimately left 
to the justice system.  
The effect of the lack of necessary mental health care can be devastating 
to families, especially when the child is left untreated. The primary purpose 
of the EPSDT provisions is prevention—to ensure that poor children 
receive comprehensive care—but it is not living up to its name.  
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1871 
Despite the fact that many children are not receiving the mental health 
treatments mandated under the EPSDT, the current legal landscape provides 
parents and guardians of these children a tenuous opportunity for relief 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was originally titled the Ku Klux Klan 
Act.48 The initial purpose of the act was to protect the civil rights of freed 
slaves and union supporters by providing a neutral forum in which the 
aggrieved could bypass the biases of state courts of the Reconstruction 
era.49 The statute guaranteed constitutional rights but did not refer to any 
statutory rights.50 In 1884, Congress added the phrase “and laws” to section 
1 of the Civil Rights Act to include a cause of action for statutory as well as 
constitutional rights.51  
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Since 1980, the Supreme Court has allowed § 1983 suits in cases alleging 
violation of constitutional rights and federal statutory rights, as well as 
those enforcing provisions of the Medicaid Act.52 The relevant part of § 
1983 reads,  
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, 
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress.53 
However, in 1997, this right to bring an action in the federal court was 
somewhat limited in the Supreme Court case Blessing v. Freestone.54 In 
Blessing, five Arizona mothers whose children were eligible for, but did not 
receive, state child support services filed suit against the director of the state 
child support agency.55 Under the Court’s reasoning, for a federal statute 
such as Medicaid to be enforceable under § 1983, “a plaintiff must assert 
the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.”56 The 
Court created a three-prong test to determine whether a federal right has 
been established. First, there must be evidence that Congress intended that 
the provision benefit the plaintiff.57 Next, “the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and 
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.”58 
Finally, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the 
states.59 
In 2002, § 1983 claims were further limited by the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Gonzaga University v. Doe.60 In Gonzaga, a former university 
student brought an action against Gonzaga University under § 1983 alleging 
violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act.61 The Court 
held that Congress creates an enforceable statutory right only when done “in 
clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than is required for 
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Congress to create new rights under an implied right of action.”62 
Additionally, the Gonzaga Court “strongly indicated that federal statutes 
enacted under the Spending Clause, as Medicaid [is], are unlikely to create 
private enforceable rights.”63 However, the Supreme Court has found 
spending clause legislation enforceable under § 1983 twice; one case 
involved denial of Medicaid services and has yet to be overruled.64 
A. § 1983 Suits and Medicaid 
When a state that has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program does 
not comply with the Medicaid statute, the secretary of the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services has discretion to terminate that state’s 
federal funds.65 However, because this measure hurts rather than helps 
Medicaid recipients, this action is rarely taken.66 Section 1983 provides an 
alternative mechanism for Medicaid recipients to contest a state application 
of Medicaid when the recipients believe that the state’s implementation 
does not comply with the federal statute. 
In a § 1983 suit contesting a state’s implementation of EPSDT, the 
plaintiff will allege that the state violated the federal Medicaid law by 
failing to provide medically necessary mental health treatment for 
Medicaid-eligible individuals.67 A § 1983 suit may be the last resort for 
families, many of whom have gone years without receiving services that a 
doctor has deemed to be medically necessary. Section 1983 suits regarding 
mental health care for children are especially crucial, because as previously 
discussed, without adequate mental health care, the consequences to the 
child, society, and the families of the children can be devastating. 
B. The Evolution of the § 1983 Analysis 
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association and Gonzaga v. Doe, two 
Supreme Court decisions, inform the way that courts analyze whether an 
individual has a private right of action to bring a § 1983 suit. These cases 
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have greatly impacted attempts at litigation to enforce provisions of the 
Medicaid Act. 
1. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association Analysis68 
In the 1990 case Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, plaintiffs 
brought an action pursuant to § 1983 challenging the administration of 
Virginia’s Medicaid program.69 The issue presented to the Supreme Court 
revolved around the Boren Amendment to the act, which required 
reimbursement according to rates that a “[s]tate finds, and makes assurances 
satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs 
which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated 
facilities.”70 The plaintiff, Virginia Hospital Association, a nonprofit 
corporation, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia against several state officials including the governor, the secretary 
of human resources, and the members of the State Department of Medical 
Assistance Services (the state agency that administers the Virginia Medicaid 
system).71 The plaintiff contended that Virginia’s reimbursement plan 
violated the act because the rates were neither reasonable nor adequate to 
meet the needs of providing care to Medicaid patients.72 
The Wilder Court examined two primary inquiries: (1) whether the 
Medicaid provision intended to benefit the putative plaintiff,73 and (2) 
whether the Boren Amendment to the act imposed a “binding obligation” on 
the states that gave rise to enforceable rights.74 The Court held that 
provisions intended to benefit the plaintiff created enforceable rights unless 
they merely reflected “congressional preference” for a certain kind of 
conduct rather than a binding obligation on the federal government,75 or 
unless they were “too vague and amorphous” such that they were “beyond 
the competence of the judiciary to enforce.”76  
The Court also held that the Boren Amendment was cast in mandatory 
rather than precatory terms, and that the provision of federal funds was 
expressly conditioned on compliance with the statute.77 For these reasons, 
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the Court concluded that the statute imposes an obligation on states 
participating in the Medicaid program to adopt reasonable and adequate 
rates and that this obligation is enforceable under § 1983 by health care 
providers.78 
Additionally, the Court did not find merit in the petitioner’s argument 
that Congress had foreclosed enforcement of the Medicaid Act under § 
1983.79 Because the Act did not expressly preclude resort to suits under § 
1983, the Court noted that there would be foreclosure only when the statute 
created a remedial scheme that is “sufficiently comprehensive . . . to 
demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 
1983.”80 The Medicaid Act contains no such scheme.81 The Court also 
rejected the petitioner’s argument that the existence of administrative 
procedures evidences intent to foreclose a private remedy in federal 
courts.82 The Court held that the Medicaid Act was enforceable under § 
1983.83 
2. Gonzaga v. Doe’s Textualism Analysis 
In 2002, § 1983 jurisprudence was forever changed with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gonzaga v. Doe. In Gonzaga, the Court clarified the 
Blessing requirements. In doing so, the Court stressed that only 
unambiguously conferred rights, not mere benefits or interests, are 
enforceable under § 1983.84 Refining the first prong of the three-part 
Blessing test, the Supreme Court engaged in a strict textualism analysis of 
FERPA and determined that the statute did not unambiguously confer an 
individual right to support a cause of action under § 1983.85 The Court’s 
analysis was framed by an inquiry into (1) whether Congress intended to 
create a private right of action by granting private rights to an identifiable 
class, and (2) whether the text is phrased in terms of the persons benefited.86 
The Gonzaga Court rejected the student’s argument that the language of 
FERPA unambiguously conferred a right to support a cause of action 
brought under § 1983.87 The Court first determined whether Congress 
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“intended to create a federal right.”88 Where there is no indication that 
Congress intended to provide a private right in the text and structure, the 
Court held that there is no basis for a private suit under § 1983 or any other 
implied right of action.89 Additionally, where a “statute by its terms grants 
no private rights to any identifiable class,” the statute is not read to provide 
a private right.90 To read a statute as having an implied private right of 
action, the Court mandated that the text of the statute must be “phrased in 
terms of the persons benefited.”91 Once a plaintiff has met its burden of 
proof by showing that the statute creates a private right, the right is 
presumably enforceable under § 1983.92  
III.  A PRAGMATIC TEXTUALISM ANALYSIS CREATES A PRIVATE 
RIGHT OF ACTION FOR EPSDT PLAINTIFFS IN § 1983 CLAIMS 
Since Gonzaga, the circuit courts have been split over whether Medicaid 
confers an individual right upon its beneficiaries. Some circuits have taken 
a strict textualism approach, looking solely at the plain language of the 
statute without analyzing statutory context or purpose, to determine whether 
the statute grants any unambiguous rights.93 Courts utilizing this approach 
have analyzed whether the provision is “phrased in terms of the person(s) 
benefited.”94 On the other hand, circuits utilizing a pragmatic textualism 
approach analyze the “meaning and importance of the provision within the 
purpose and structure of the [statute] as a whole.”95 Thus, those individuals 
who have been denied services under EPSDT are left facing an uncertain 
legal landscape. 
The Supreme Court’s Gonzaga decision made critical the inquiry of 
whether the pertinent statute contains “rights-creating” language such as 
that found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972.96 Under Gonzaga, evidence of a 
congressional intent to create a private right of action can be found in the 
statute’s language and its structure.97 While the legal landscape for would-
be plaintiffs is less than clear, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Gonzaga left 
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plaintiffs with a clear directive to employ a textualism approach to standing 
questions under § 1983.98  
A.  Circuit Court Application of Gonzaga’s Textualism Analysis to 
Medicaid Enforcement Cases 
The necessary inquiry in post-Gonzaga cases is whether Congress 
intended to confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.99 Courts 
provide redress only for a plaintiff who asserts a “violation of a federal 
right, not merely a violation of federal law.”100  
To determine whether the statute has the requisite rights-creating 
language, strict textualism courts examine the specific language of the 
statute.101 Courts that utilize a strict textualism approach to analyzing the 
EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act have not held that § 1983 provides a 
mechanism through which citizens can enforce federal law.102 For example, 
the Sixth Circuit utilized this approach in analyzing the EPSDT provisions 
in Westside Mothers v. Olszewski.103 Similarly, the Seventh, Ninth, and 
Tenth Circuits utilized this approach when analyzing other provisions of the 
Medicaid Act.104 The danger of this trend is that it may be adopted by 
circuit courts that have been silent on whether the EPSDT provisions of the 
Medicaid Act grant citizens a private right of action. As of today, the 
Second, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits are silent on whether EPSDT 
beneficiaries may bring a § 1983 action, while the Ninth and Tenth Circuits 
have yet to decide an EPSDT-specific § 1983 case. 
In Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, a welfare rights organization brought a 
§ 1983 action against state officials alleging systemic deprivation of EPSDT 
services.105 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that a 
provision mandating that participating states provide accessible medical 
services for eligible beneficiaries106 failed the first prong of the Blessing 
test107 and did not provide Medicaid recipients or providers with an 
enforceable right under § 1983.108 The court justified this finding by 
focusing on the aggregate focus of the provision rather than an individual 
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focus.109 In its Blessing analysis, the court first held that the provision 
speaks of the state’s obligation to develop “methods and procedures” rather 
than individual benefits.110 Second, the court found the language of the 
Medicaid provision to be too “broad and nonspecific” to be suited for 
judicial remedy.111 The court determined that the general objectives of the 
provision were too broad to identify what standards were required by terms 
such as “efficiency, economy, and quality of care.”112 Concluding that it had 
neither the expertise nor the experience to make decisions such as these, the 
court held that the language of the statute was ill suited for judicial 
remedy.113 
Under other recent holdings, rights conferred under the EPSDT 
provisions of the Medicaid Act have been held to be clearly established 
federal rights which can be enforced under the civil rights statute.114 These 
courts have utilized a different approach by analyzing the purpose and 
meaning of the statute as a whole.115 Since Gonzaga, the First, Third, Fifth, 
and Eighth Circuits have applied this pragmatic textualism analysis to § 
1983 suits concerning the Medicaid Act. These courts have held that the 
EPSDT provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(4)(B) and 1396d(r), create 
enforceable federal rights and that private plaintiffs do have a private cause 
of action under § 1983.116 A pragmatic approach to the textualism analysis 
is more appropriate than a strict textualism analysis due to the holistic 
nature of analyzing the statute.  
Courts utilizing a pragmatic approach also engage in the Gonzaga 
analysis. In the EPSDT context, the court first determines whether needy 
children were the specific intended beneficiaries of the provision. In 
Pediatric Specialty Care v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 
plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action to enjoin proposed budget cutbacks that 
would allegedly violate their right to EPSDT services.117 The Eighth Circuit 
held that the plaintiffs would prevail under the Gonzaga analytical 
framework because 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13) calls for state payment of 
costs for diagnostic, screening, preventative, and rehabilitative services 
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when recommended by a doctor.118 The court found that the intended 
beneficiaries of this subsection are needy children as well as those who 
incur costs in providing those services.119 Other circuit courts have found 
similarly.120 The Eighth Circuit upheld precedent and found that the 
language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A), a non-EPSDT Medicaid 
provision, created clearly established rights to equal access to quality 
medical care.121  
Next, pragmatic courts determine whether the right is “so ‘vague and 
amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.”122 
Some courts have gone so far as to read this factor as an insult. For 
example, in Bryson v. Shumway, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted 
that “common law courts have reviewed actions for reasonableness since 
time immemorial.”123 This is similar to the approach the Fifth Circuit took 
in S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood when it did not find the analysis interpreting 
the EPSDT statutes to “strain judicial competence.”124 The Fifth Circuit 
noted that the type of analysis that the plaintiff requested was “the type of 
work in which courts engage in every day.”125 Further, the court found the 
EPSDT provisions no more “vague and amorphous” than other statutory 
terms that the court has found capable of judicial enforcement.126 
Third, pragmatic courts determine whether the statute unambiguously 
imposes a binding obligation on the state. In Sabree v. Richman, the Third 
Circuit held that by “requiring states which accept Medicaid funding to 
provide . . . services with reasonable promptness, Congress conferred 
specific entitlements on individuals” and there could be no ambiguity about 
the state’s obligations.127 Because the court found the language of the 
statute unambiguous when reading it as a whole, it did not look into the 
legislative history of the Medicaid Act.128 
B. A More Precise Reading 
Courts may also look into the statutory construction, purpose, and 
congressional preclusion when determining whether a plaintiff has a private 
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right.129 In Sabree, the Third Circuit did not find any provision precluding 
individual actions and concluded, “Congress clearly and unambiguously 
conferred the rights of which plaintiffs have allegedly been deprived by 
Pennsylvania, and has not precluded individual enforcement of those 
rights.”130  
While the majority of circuit courts that have heard a Medicaid EPSDT 
case have found that there is a private right of action to bring a § 1983 
claim, many circuits have not decided an EPSDT case. This leaves the door 
open for a strict textualism approach in those silent circuits for many 
would-be plaintiffs—an analysis which would likely bar the plaintiffs from 
seeking enforcement of EPSDT provisions under § 1983. 
While the strict textualism approach utilizes the Gonzaga analysis, the 
more pragmatic approach provides a more accurate reading of the statute in 
question. For example, a strict textualism approach does not take into 
account that Congress amended the EPSDT portion of the Medicaid Act in 
1989 so that the EPSDT provisions would be mandatory for all states opting 
into Medicaid. Additionally, a strict textualism approach does not recognize 
that the EPSDT provisions and the services to which Medicaid-eligible 
children are entitled are substantially different from the coverage that adults 
receive. Because Medicaid-eligible children are entitled to any medically 
necessary care, courts utilizing the pragmatic approach have held that they 
have a private right of action to bring a § 1983 claim. Finally, a pragmatic 
approach would recognize the purpose of the EPSDT provisions: to prevent 
future medical or mental health care issues and to decrease future costs to 
society.  
These peripheral, but important, distinctions give the court a better, more 
precise understanding of the congressional intent in implementing EPSDT 
provisions. Courts often look to congressional intent when a statute is not 
clear. This analysis should be used, along with a consideration of the 
statutory language, in determining that the Medicaid-eligible child is the 
intended beneficiary, and thus has a private right of action under § 1983. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Given the large number of children who are covered by Medicaid, the 
failure of the states to properly execute the EPSDT provisions is 
unjustifiable. The EPSDT provisions were adopted by Congress to prevent 
potential development or worsening of conditions, illnesses, and 
disabilities; yet despite the 1989 amendments to the Medicaid Act, states 
are still struggling to implement the mandatory and necessary services. This 
lack of mental health screenings and services can not only harm the child’s 
wellbeing, but can lead to detrimental effects on families and society as a 
whole. 
The legal landscape for plaintiffs seeking to enforce proper state 
implementation of the EPSDT provisions has a complex history beginning 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1871, originally enacted to protect the civil 
rights of freed slaves, but now allowing for § 1983 suits in cases alleging 
violation of constitutional rights as well as federal statutory rights. Case law 
has left would-be plaintiffs in a state of uncertainty; plaintiffs in some states 
have a right to bring a § 1983 suit in federal courts, while in other states, 
they have no such right. Section 1983, Blessing, Wilder, and Gonzaga have 
interwoven into a tapestry of complex litigation—litigation that is only the 
beginning of the road for Medicaid-eligible children who are in need of 
mental health care. 
The Supreme Court has virtually eliminated the implied private right 
cause of action by demanding that the statute must contain “rights-creating” 
language. Gonzaga has likely precluded many Medicaid recipients from 
challenging state violations of the statute. However, the EPSDT provisions 
pass the Blessing test, even with the high threshold that Gonzaga has 
created. Furthermore, Gonzaga did not overrule the Supreme Court’s earlier 
decision, Wilder. Congress intended the EPSDT services to be broad, 
preventative, and mandatory. For this reason, courts should use a pragmatic 
textualism analysis to determine whether § 1983 creates a private right of 
action in federal courts when a plaintiff wants to challenge a state’s 
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violation of the Medicaid Act. The courts utilizing the pragmatic approach 
consider the provisions as a whole, including an examination of the purpose 
of the statute and the intent of Congress—giving the analysis a more precise 
reading. 
The Gonzaga decision has complicated § 1983 jurisprudence, but has not 
completely precluded EPSDT-eligible children from bringing suit in federal 
court. While the circuits are split as to whether the Medicaid Act can 
survive the textualism analysis of Gonzaga, the EPSDT provisions provide 
for clear “rights-creating” language if analyzed employing the pragmatic 
approach. While the majority of circuits that have reviewed this issue have 
found that the EPSDT provisions confer an actionable individual right by 
utilizing a pragmatic textualism analysis, the Supreme Court should, but has 
yet to, clarify whether the Gonzaga analysis presupposes an individual right 
conferred under EPSDT.131  
Another possible approach to clarify whether EPSDT recipients have an 
individual right to bring a § 1983 suit is further action by Congress. 
Congress could give the secretary of Health and Human Services multiple 
means to enforce state compliance with the Medicaid Act. Currently, the 
only power the secretary has is to terminate funds—an action that could 
have devastating effects for those who are receiving their necessary medical 
help. Allowing the secretary more options to enforce compliance with the 
Medicaid Act could potentially benefit those recipients not receiving the 
services they are entitled to without improperly removing services from an 
entire state’s Medicaid recipients. The termination of Medicaid funds would 
be an extreme measure the secretary would enforce only if the state failed to 
take corrective action after being sanctioned for different levels of 
compliance violations.  
Perhaps we, as a society, need to push Congress to make the EPSDT 
rights-creating language more explicit. While in the abstract this seems like 
a tenuous way to enforce state compliance with the Medicaid statute, under 
Gonzaga, it is the most obvious way for Medicaid-eligible children to be 
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able to bring a § 1983 action. Through grassroots efforts, we can hold 
Congress accountable to their goal of providing medical and mental health 
care to low-income children to prevent health issues as they get older.132 
The coverage that a child receives was purposefully drafted in broad terms, 
providing a standard of medical or mental health care beyond the standards 
for Medicaid-eligible adults. This should create a level of coverage that 
allows for screening, treatment, and prevention of conditions, illnesses, and 
disabilities. While Congress made the inclusion of the EPSDT provisions 
mandatory on all states, there has been very little enforcement. Amending 
the EPSDT provisions to provide for explicit rights-creating language 
would pass muster under both the pragmatic and strict textualism analyses. 
Early intervention of mental health conditions, illnesses, and disabilities 
could prevent deterioration, future problems, and costs to society. Congress 
recognized this concept when it mandated the EPSDT provisions that have 
the purpose of prevention. Even President George W. Bush’s Commission 
on Mental Health stated: “When the system fails to deliver the right types 
and combination of care, the results can be disastrous for our entire nation: 
school failure, substance abuse, homelessness, minor crime and 
incarceration.”133 Unfortunately, children needing mental health care will 
not simply grow out of their need. It is time for public systems and the 
community to make medically necessary mental health care a priority. 
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